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Abstract 
 
Since the causes and dynamics of the unofficial economy are inseparable from the socio-
cultural dimension, the authors analyze the dynamics of opportunism and (dis)trust in 
institutions in Croatia during the last half of the nineties. The analyses carried out are based 
on work in which the first author provided a theoretical conceptualization of the socio-cultural 
dimension of the unofficial economy (Štulhofer, 1997).  Measurement of the dynamics of 
opportunism and (dis)trust in institutions was carried out on data collected in the World 
Values Study – Croatia 1995 (N = 1170) and the European Values Study – Croatia 1999 (N = 
1003).  The results point out that in the observed period the level of opportunism decreased, 
with respect to both the intensity and to the distribution. Interestingly, there has been no 
change in the age structure of opportunism (the youngest age cohort is still the most 
opportunistic). Unlike opportunism, with which it is positively correlated, distrust in 
institutions has increased, particularly in the youngest age cohort.  Considering the theoretical 
model, in which the level of opportunism reflects the moral costs related to participation in 
the underground economy, the decrease in the level of opportunism and economic growth in 
the post-war period suggest a moderate reduction in the underground economy in Croatia 
during the second half of the nineties. 
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OPPORTUNISM, INSTITUTIONS AND MORAL COSTS: 
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSION OF THE UNDERGROUND 
ECONOMY IN CROATIA 1995-1999* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The unofficial, informal, underground or gray economy (UE)1 is one of the most interesting 
of socio-economic phenomena.  The reasons are quite familiar: the UE is an omnipresent 
phenomenon that cannot be precisely measured, its relationship to economic growth and 
social development still being contradictory (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Portes, 1994; Frey 
and Schneider, 2000).  However, in any consideration of the many paradoxes connected with 
the UE it is easy to foresee the two central characteristics - its omnipresence and ambiguous 
relation to growth - on which a systematic analysis of the UE is founded.  That is, 
understanding of the multi-determination of the UE by so-called endogenous (economic) and 
exogenous (socio-cultural) variables is considerably impoverished if the two dimensions are 
observed in isolation from each other. Looked at independently, the ubiquitous presence of 
the UE suggests it is unrelated to the socio-cultural context. On the other hand, taking into 
consideration the ambiguity of its relation to growth leads to an opposite conclusion. Here it 
would seem that the UE can be explained only by reference to institutional and socio-cultural 
properties. 
The point of departure for the paper is that the causes and dynamics of the UE cannot be 
understood in isolation from their social and economic matrix, from the space in which 
economic and cultural conditions constitute a unified point of origin for individual actions.2  
This kind of understanding is not new of course (Portes, 1994; Schneider and Enste, 2000; 
Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987). The point of drawing attention to it is to recall the importance 
of an interdisciplinary approach and the need for theoretical and methodological pluralism. 
Such a procedure is of particular importance in the analysis of the socio-economic events in 
transitional countries, in which the recent major economic and social changes are still shaping 
daily reality. The example of the transitional (or post-transitional) societies has clearly 
delineated the linkage between the economy, politics and culture (Feige and Ott, 1999; Eilat 
and Zinners, 2000; Štulhofer, 2000). 
The paper outlines an analysis of the dynamics of social and cultural factors related to the UE 
during the second half of the nineties. The first chapter looks at a previous attempt at socio-
cultural analysis of the UE in Croatia, its results and the methodology applied, which the 
present paper is closely following. In the second chapter we describe the samples and 
instruments used, while in the third we present the results of bivariate and multivariate 
analyses. The final section of the paper offers a short discussion of the findings.  
 
                                                 
* This article is published in Croatia in the journal “Financijska teorija i praksa”, 26 (1), 2002., pp. 213-
228, available at http://ijf.hr/finpraksa/1-02.htm. 
1  In this work, the UE or shadow economy is understood to comprise all economic activities, direct or 
indirect (such as tax evasion) that intentionally avoid inclusion in official statistics - remaining 
unrecorded. Although this definition is both too narrow and insufficiently precise (Frey and Schneider, 
2000) it seems that not a single definition of UE introduced so far has managed to satisfy all of the 
criteria (Schneider and Enste, 2000: 79). 
2 From this point of view, the differentiation of endogenous and exogenous variables in the context of 
the UE is a mere convention in economics.  This leads to the conclusion that any reduction in the UE 
will necessarily have to be based on the aggregate effects of socio-cultural, legal and economic 
changes. 
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The UE in Croatia 
 
The first systematic research into the UE in Croatia was started in 1995.  According to the 
results that were published, the UE in the mid-nineties came to “at least 25 percent” of GDP 
(***, 1997: 11).  This figure is comparable with other estimates that place Croatia in the 
group of countries with an average incidence of UE (Eilat and Zinnes, 2000: 42)3 According 
to these measurements, the greatest growth in the UE in the transition countries occurred in 
the period between 1990 and 1993, after which stagnation ensued. The leaders of the Croatian 
research project addressed the negative implications of this kind of dynamics, warning that 
the UE might become a permanent feature of the national economy (Bićanić and Ott, 1997). 
The first author of this paper was involved in the 1995 research. In one of the two project 
papers he attempted to throw light on the socio-cultural background of the UE in Croatia, 
positing that social opportunism is a rough proxy for willingness to participate in the UE 
(Štulhofer, 1997: 136). The most important result, as well as the most worrying, was the 
finding that it was precisely the youngest and above average educated respondents who were 
most inclined to opportunistic viewpoints. In the conclusion, this finding was commented on 
as “the possibility for a 'natural reproduction' of the UE”, which could allow for its 
persistence even in the face of positive advances in the official economy (Štulhofer, 1997: 
138). 
The obvious limitation of analyzing the UE by measuring opportunism4 is a less acute 
problem if we have longitudinal data at our disposal. Longitudinal comparisons enable the 
identification of socio-cultural trends that we can then link to economic indicators and 
econometric measurements of the UE testing the postulated interplay of exogenous and 
endogenous factors.  
The authors of this paper admit with relief that they have not set themselves this task.  The 
objectives of this short study are much more modest and constitute only a part of the 
preparatory work for the proposed testing. The first of them is to establish changes in the 
levels of opportunism and distrust in institutions during the 1995-1999 period, and ascertain 
the dynamics of the moral costs of participating in the UE for specific age cohorts. Thinking 
about future dynamics of the UE it is highly relevant question whether it is the oldest and 
economically marginal age cohort or the youngest one the most inclined to opportunism. The 
other goal is to compare the socio-cultural structure of the UE at two points in time. To meet 
these goals would be to illuminate the 'exogenous' generator of the UE in Croatia. 
 
Sample and instruments  
 
The 1997 paper (Štulhofer, 1997) was based on data collected in 1995. In the meantime, a 
similar research study has been carried out using a largely comparable set of variables (Črpić 
and Rimac, 2000). The results presented in this and the next chapter are based on the World 
Values Survey – Croatia 1995 (N = 1,170) and European Values Survey - Croatia 1999 (N = 
1003).5 Both studies were carried out on a national sample using a multi-stage probability 
method. Surveyed individuals were between 18 and 80 years of age. The main characteristics 
of both samples are shown in Table 1. It is worth noticing the over-representation of college 
educated subjects and the under-representation of respondents with only elementary 
education. This fact is obviously a limiting factor in the interpretation of the results. 
 
                                                 
3 The authors distinguish three groups of countries, those with small, medium and large UE (less than 
20% of GDP, from 20 to 40%, and more than 40% respectively).  
4 Obviously, we are measuring only the moral costs of participating in the UE - not the UE itself. 
5 WVS 1995 was carried out by Erasmus gilda, Zagreb, and EVS 1999 by the Catholic Theological 
Faculty of the University of Zagreb. 
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Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
 WVS-1995 EVS-1999 
Total number of respondents (N) 1 170 1 003 
average age 
age cohorts (N) 
A (18-29) 
B (30-50) 
C (51-80) 
46.2 
 
216 (18.5%) 
506 (43.2%) 
448 (38.3%) 
39.2 
 
410 (40.9%) 
413 (41.2%) 
180 (17.9%) 
sex  (%) 
F 
M 
 
52.7 
47.3 
 
57.3 
42.7 
education (%) 
primary 
secondary 
college/university 
 
22.8 
51.3 
25.9 
 
14.3 
63.5 
22.2 
size of birthplace (%) 
up to  2 000 residents 
2 000 – 10 000 
10 000 – 50 000 
50 000 – 500 000 
Zagreb 
 
32.5 
16.1 
13.1 
20.2 
18.1 
 
35.4 
23.2 
14.4 
11.1 
16 
 
Following the outline of analyses presented in the earlier work (Štulhofer, 1997), both 
samples are divided into three age cohorts (A, B and C; cf. Table 1) in order to establish the 
effect of generational affiliation on intensity of opportunism and other socio-cultural factors 
relevant to the UE.  The age cohorts could be also viewed as specific macro-networks 
determined by social roles (for example, the B group is more engaged in professional and 
family terms than the A group) and the corresponding interests and communication channels.  
The following instruments were used in the analyses:6 
The index of opportunism consists of two variables measuring the attitude towards tax evasion 
(Can tax evasion be justified?) and corruption (Can bribery be justified?). Each variable used 
a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (never justified) to 10 (always justified). The index is the 
average value on both scales, the greater value expressing more pronounced opportunism. 
Distrust in institutions was measured by asking respondents how much trust they have in the 
legal system and parliament (unlike the WVS, the EVS did not ask about trust in the 
government); answers were scored on a 4-item scale (a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, 
and none at all).  
Preference for egalitarian distribution is one of two indicators of economic traditionalism, 
which is a characteristic of collectivist economies. The persistence of economic 
traditionalism, a set of values and habits acquired during the previous economic and political 
system, can be explained as a consequence of the cultural inertia. Acceptance of 
egalitarianism was measured by a 10-item scale ranging from 1 = "we need larger income 
differences as incentives for individual effort" to 10 = "incomes should be made more equal". 
The second indicator of economic traditionalism, the preference for state paternalism was 
measured by a 10-item scale ranging from 1 = "people should take more responsibility to 
provide for themselves" to 10 = "the government should take more responsibility to ensure 
that everyone is provided for". 
 
                                                 
6 For a theoretical elaboration see Štulhofer (1997). 
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Results and discussion 
 
The basic theoretical assumption of the paper is that the dynamics of social opportunism 
coincide with the dynamics of the UE. The mechanism that binds the two phenomena, the 
moral costs (MC)7, is simple: the expansion of opportunism in everyday interactions leads to 
a reduction in MC and a readiness to bypass or breach social norms. The actual breaking of 
the norms, as participation in the UE presumes, involves certain risks. If they are small 
enough, i.e. if norm-breaking behavior usually passes unpunished, social opportunism will 
continue to spread.  
As already mentioned, the validity of using opportunism in an analysis of the UE is based on 
the similarity of their curves, or - if it is to do with a one-off measurement in several countries 
- in a coincidence of rankings. Figure 1 gives an example of such an analysis carried out on a 
small sample of transitional countries. Although it does not attain statistical significance 
(Spearman’s ρ = 0.7; p>.05), the accordance between the opportunism and the UE ranking is 
noticeable.8 
 
 
Figure 1. Opportunism and the UE in five transitional countries.9 
 
 
It can be safely assumed that a certain level of opportunism exists within every society. In 
reality, the economic context and the historically specific cultural development will have a 
crucial influence on this abstract rate of opportunism. As is well known, in transitional 
countries both dimensions, economic and cultural, have a markedly unfavorable effect. 
Transition costs, especially at the beginning of the nineties, led to a dramatic fall in living 
standards of the majority of the population (***, 1998) and led to rapid re-stratification, 
which (helped by the media accounts of the criminal aspects of privatization) created 
enormous disappointment and cynicism. In such an anomic situation, the reduction of MC 
was additionally accelerated by the cultural inheritance marked by distrust in official 
(communist) institutions and absence of civil society. In other words, the moral climate of the 
post-communist transition is determined both situationally and historically.  
In 1995, the level of opportunism in Croatia was the highest of a group consisting of five 
transitional countries and five EU countries (Štulhofer, 1997: 130-131). Four years later, the 
                                                 
7 For an empirical assumption indicating different moral prices of procedures associated with tax 
evasion see Kirchler, Maciejovsky and Schneider (2001). 
8 The higher the rank, the more widespread opportunism and the UE. 
9 UE data are taken from Schneider and Enste (2000: 101-102); for each country, the average value is 
calculated on the basis of the available measurements. The average size of the UE for all the countries 
except for Croatia is from the 1990-1993 period, when the level of opportunism was measured by the 
World Values Survey (Basanez, Inglehart and Moreno, 1996). The UE values for Croatia are from the 
1994-1995 period. 
1
2
3
4
5
Croatia Romania Bulgaria Hungary Slovenia
UE ranking    opportunism ranking
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intensity of opportunism decreased (Table 2) implying a rise of the moral costs.10 More 
detailed analysis pointed out that the variability of opportunism within the population 
decreased, too. This suggests an increased agreement about what is socially acceptable, and 
what is not. 
  
 
Table 2. The level of opportunism in Croatia 1995-1999  
 
 WVS 1995 EVS 1999 
Means (s.d.) 
2.9 (2.6) 2.2 (1.9) 
INDEX OF OPPORTUNISM 
/the larger the number, the more pronounced 
opportunism11/ p<.01 
 
 
Figure 2 provides a more detailed insight into the dynamics of opportunism in the given 
period.  The trend towards a reduction in opportunism can be observed both in attitudes 
toward tax evasion and corruption. But is this a reduction in intensity or in prevalence of 
opportunism, or a combination of the two? The answer to that question is important when 
considering the dynamics of the UE.  A reduction of intensity at the cost of prevalence could 
be less desirable than the reverse process.12 Our analyses point out simultaneous reduction in 
both intensity and prevalence of opportunism13.  
 
 
Figure 2. Elements of opportunism: tax evasion and corruption 1995 – 1999 
 
 
 
A – youngest age cohort 
B – oldest age cohort 
 
Opposite to expectations, which were based on the length of socialization in the former 
system, the first author ascertained in his the earlier work that the highest level of 
opportunism was displayed by the youngest, and not the oldest age group (Štulhofer, 1997). 
                                                 
10 It is reasonable to assume that part of the reduction in the intensity of opportunism can be ascribed to 
an increased benefit from participating in the official economy, especially with respect to firms with a 
considerable growth potential. 
11 The scale ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 denotes an absence of opportunism. 
12 A large number of individuals inclined to tax evasion is a greater problem than a small number of 
individuals ready to offer bribes in order to reduce their tax burden. 
13 In the 1999 research, twice as many respondents (54%) as in the 1995 expressed the zero degree of 
opportunism. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A-1995. B-1995. C-1995. A-1999. B-1999. C-1999.
toleration of tax evasion    toleration of corruption 
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As is shown in Figure 2, there have been no changes in the interim. It is still the youngest age 
cohort that is most, and the oldest that is least, inclined to opportunism. As in the first 
measurement, the differences among the age groups are significant in both indicators (p<.01). 
The fundamental socio-economic characteristics of respondents inclined to opportunism are 
given in Table 3. In line with the previous results, opportunism is positively correlated with 
education and income. Although these are weak links (of only marginal impact in multivariate 
analysis), which seem to weaken further over time, they do indicate potential resilience of the 
Croatian UE to changes in the unemployment rate.  
 
 
Table 3. Correlation between opportunism and selected socio-demographic variables.14 
 
1995 
1999 Opportunism Education Income 
Opportunism / .15* .09* 
.18* 
.11* 
Education .15* .09* / 
.44* 
.30* 
Income .18* .11* 
.44* 
.30* / 
* p<.01 
 
  
The structure of opportunism is also defined by the attitudes toward institutions. According to 
the earlier study, opportunism was positively linked with distrust in the judicial institutions 
and the government, and negatively with economic traditionalism, which included a 
preference toward state paternalism (Štulhofer, 1997: 136). The first finding is hardly 
surprising: distrust in the institutions of the system – their effectiveness, morality and/or 
justice – produces opportunism as a rational strategy. The second finding, requires an 
elaboration. Economic traditionalism, operationalized as the acceptance of egalitarian 
distribution and collective ownership, and the preference for state paternalism, is a 
consequence of socialization in a planned economy (Štulhofer, 2000: 106-108). Since it is 
mostly the respondents in the oldest age cohort who espouse the values of economic 
traditionalism, their below-average opportunism can be ascribed to both their age – in which 
withdrawal from economic activity leads to decreasing benefits of opportunism15 - and the 
inherited ideological rejection of the egoism of wealth-making.16 
Table 4 presents an analysis of the structure of opportunism at two points of time. The 
dimensions in which the changes occurred are shadowed. As expected, the relation between 
opportunism and lack of trust in institutions has remained unchanged. Distrust and 
opportunism, it seems, feed on each other. Interestingly, the correlation is weaker in 1999. 
The reason for this is different dynamics of the two phenomena. While the level of 
opportunism has decreased (Table 2), the level of distrust has increased (Figure 4). 
 
                                                 
14 The coefficients are non-parametric (Spearman's ρ).  
15 Possibly increasing the corresponding moral costs. 
16 In the collectivist ideology, getting rich is often interpreted as success at the expense of others, 
achieved by deceit or exploitation. 
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Table 4. Correlation between opportunism, distrust in institutions, and economic 
traditionalism 
 
1995. 
1999. Opportunism 
Distrust in 
institutions 
Preference for 
egalitarian 
distribution 
Preference for 
state paternalism 
Opportunism / .22** .16** 
-.13** 
-.02 
-.09** 
-.04 
Distrust in 
institutions 
 / -.07* -.01 
-.02 
-.05 
Preference for 
egalitarian 
distribution 
 
 / -.31** -.05 
* p<.05; ** p<.01 
 
  
The relationship between opportunism and economic traditionalism (preference for egalitarian 
distribution and state paternalism) gives a different picture. The 1995 correlations ceased to 
be significant. The analyses carried out, including multiple regressions17, failed to produce 
any meaningful interpretation of the change. Having in mind the absence of correlation 
between the two indicatiors, economic traditionalism - as operationalized in this paper - has to 
be abandoned as a meaningful theoretical construction.18 Regarding the question whether this 
should be taken as a sign of the disintegration of collectivist values19 our data are silent. 
Figure 3 shows age differences in the acceptance of egalitarian distribution and preference for 
state paternalism. For both indicators there is a statistically significant difference between 
1995 and 1999 measurements (p<.01). Particularly interesting is the large decrease in the 
preference for state paternalism. It is not clear to what extent could this be the result of an 
increased distrust in the effectiveness, morality and justice of the government (Matić, 2000; 
Štulhofer, 1999).  
 
 
Figure 3. Economic traditionalism 1995 – 1999 
 
Let us return to the question of (dis)trust in institutions. Figure 4 shows in detail the changes 
that occurred from the middle of the nineties to the end. The trend in both cases is identical. 
Lack of confidence in the legal system and the parliament has increased significantly.  There 
                                                 
17 Showing that age and distrust in institutions are the most important predictors of opportunism at both 
points of time. 
18 The differences in the correlations between opportunism and egalitarian distribution, as well as 
between paternalism and egalitarian distribution (at the two points of time) are statistically significant 
(p<.01); the significance was tested using Fisher’s z-values (Guilford, 1956). 
19 This is a plausible thesis, since postcommunist transition is now more than a decade old. We should 
expect certain changes in the perception of economic life due to the operation of market principles. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
preference for egalitarian
distribution    
preference for state
paternalism
WVS - 1995. EVS - 1999.
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are undoubtedly a number of reasons for this, but the interpretation should take into 
consideration the particular moment in which the 1995 research was carried out. WVS data 
collection was undertaken soon after the last major, and successfully concluded, military 
operation, which marked the end of the war in Croatia. The timing could have resulted in a 
momentary eruption of trust in official institutions. 
 
 
Figure 4. Trust in institutions 1995 – 1999 (%) 
 
 
Discussing the demographic structure of distrust, the earlier study established a positive 
correlation with age (Štulhofer, 1997: 134). According to 1999 data, the difference among the 
age cohorts had faded away in the case of mistrust in the legal system, but not with respect to 
the parliament. In both years of measurement, the young express most and the oldest least 
distrust (p<.01). There remains, then, the question of how much the distrust of the youngest 
age group is the reflection of a new postmodern or postmaterialist cultural climate, marked by 
skepticism, lack of trust and the dissipation of loyalty to formal institutions (Halman, 1995; 
Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam 2000). 
 
Discussion and conclusion: The UE in Croatia at the end of the nineties 
 
Reducing the UE is currently high on the list of priorities of many governments. Bearing in 
mind the considerable rise in the UE in OECD countries in the last forty years (Schneider, 
2000) - which has been ascribed to an increase in regulation, the burden of taxes, 
unemployment, and, finally, to the decline of civic virtue (Schneider and Enste, 2000: 82) - 
this comes as no surprise.  In less developed countries, and particularly in the developing 
world, concern about the UE20 is mostly shared by foreign donors and financiers (Eilat and 
Zinnes, 2000). 
How much, if at all, should Croatia be concerned about the UE? The recent analysis of 
dynamics of the UE in the transitional countries provides an answer. Although the 
phenomenon of UE remains complex and often ambiguous, according to Eilat and Zinnes 
(2000) in the postcommunist transitional setting the UE reflects the failure of institutions. A 
number of correlations they report on substantiate the claim: 
 
• UE is negatively correlated with economic openness and the volume of investments 
• UE is negatively correlated with tax revenue 
• UE is positively correlated with corruption 
• UE is positively correlated with the degree of economic regulation 
                                                 
20 Which has often the role of an alternative social security network. 
41,8
27
31,8
17,4
42,3
50,4
44,2
54
19,1 14,4 25,4
6,7
0
100
legal system 1995 legal system 1999 Parliament 1995 Parliament 1999
a great deal quite a lot
not very much none at all
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• UE is negatively correlated with the development of the banking system and the 
capital market 
• UE is negatively correlated with the rule of law 
• UE is negatively correlated with the quality of the political establishment and the 
development of civil society.21  
 
These linkages do not only have major economic consequences. A large or growing UE has a 
destructive effect on social development in general. Impeding the development of economic 
institutions and international competitiveness, as well as diminishing social trust, civicness 
and lawfulness, the UE is a phenomenon that the transitional societies can not afford to 
ignore.22  
Croatia does not seem to belong to the group of countries with a small UE (Eilat and Zinnes, 
2000: 45; Schneider and Enste, 2000: 101-103). The first systematic attempt at producing an 
estimate of the size of the Croatian UE was accompanied by a cautious comment pointing out 
that the effect of a quarter of GDP (which was the estimated size of the UE) on the official 
economy and economic policy can not, and should not, be ignored (Bićanić, 1997: 24). Thus, 
ascertainment of the possible changes in the size of the UE is an important task, especially 
since 1995 was a kind of a watershed, a year in which the war economy disappeared together 
with its shadiness and adaptive rationality.23 If it is established that in the second half of the 
nineties the size of the UE in Croatia decreased, the task of writing policy guidelines will be 
very different than in case an increase is diagnosed.  
What sort of conclusion about the dynamics of the UE derives from this work? In order to 
address this question, let us consider briefly the findings presented so far: 
1. In the observed period the level of opportunism decreased, both in terms of its 
intensity and prevalence.24 
2. The age structure of social opportunism remained unchanged; the youngest age 
cohort is still the most opportunistic. 
3. Unlike opportunism, with which it is positively correlated, distrust in institutions 
increased. Again, the lack of trust is characteristic for the youngest age cohort. 
4. Economic traditionalism ceased to be an important element of the socio-cultural 
structure of UE.  
Opposite trends in the dynamics of opportunism and distrust in institutions make 
consideration of the dynamics of the UE more difficult. Should we attach greater weight to 
decreasing opportunism or increasing distrust? Since we have no measures of the relative 
impact of the two factors on the formation of moral costs, a certain amount of arbitrariness 
seems unavoidable. With this in mind, we suggest that the decrease in opportunism, and 
related increase of moral costs, should be considered as more important for the dynamics of 
UE during the 1995-1999 period. There are two reasons for this: methodological and 
theoretical. The first relates to a situational refraction of (dis)trust in institutions responsible 
for a short-term "post-war" increase in trust.25 The other argument is based on a theoretical 
model that postulates a sequential relationship between distrust, opportunism and the UE (Fig. 
                                                 
21 “[A] large shadow economy leads to a disintegration of social norms, respect for official institutions, 
and rule of law” (Eilat and Zinnes, 2000: 4). 
22 Corruption is a good example (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998). Although the UE can 
also be the result of an over-regulated and thus corrupt system, its growth, directly and indirectly 
(through the spreading of opportunism), encourages and maintains corruption. This situation is part of 
the everyday reality in most transitional countries (Krygier, 2001).  
23 In situations of great uncertainty to which the state of war belongs, the moral costs of sidestepping 
the norms are reduced by the logic of survival. Unpredictability encourages a short-term rationality.  
24 In 1995 some degree of opportunism was displayed by 72% of respondents. Four years later the 
figure dropped to 48%. 
25 We are referring to the already mentioned assumption that the 1995 measurement included a 
temporarily inflated trust in institutions. 
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5). If lack of trust in institutions precedes an opportunist perception of reality, the dynamics of 
the latter should be a better predictor of the UE. Is the opposite interpretation equally 
plausible? What if (inherited) opportunism is a cause, and not the consequence, of lack of 
trust in institutions? In our opinion such a sequence is possible, but not very probable. The 
first reason for this is that such a sequence neglects the impact of the powerful initial 
optimism and public trust in the (new) institutions that arose during the political 
transformation at the beginning of the nineties, which were perceived as anti-communist and 
Croatian. Secondly, as one of the authors has demonstrated earlier (Štulhofer, 2000), public 
perception of the economic processes during the nineties was determined primarily by the 
reaction to socio-economic reality (situational explanation). The influence of socio-cultural 
habits (cultural inertia explanation) was marginal, except in the case of the oldest age cohort. 
 
 
Figure 5. Model of the formation of the moral costs of taking part in the UE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above speculation is based entirely on the analysis of the socio-cultural dimension. Direct 
economic and socio-economic effects (growth, improvements in the standard of living, 
dynamics of unemployment, tax burdens, impact of tax reform, improved efficiency of law 
enforcement etc.) on the actors' strategic behavior did not enter our discussion. Adding them 
to our starting point emphasizing the effect of decreased opportunism26 - especially the fact 
that the economic situation in the 1995-1999 period was marked by growth as compared with 
the preceding period - we predict a mild decrease of the Croatian UE in the second half of the 
90s.27 
In the words of Schneider (2000: 17), in the next steps it should be worked out in a much 
more precise way how the shadow economy is also influenced by non-economic influences. 
We hope that the analysis presented in this paper will read as a suggestion for a fruitful 
approach in that direction. 
                                                 
26 Decrease in opportunism reflects necessarily either a more positive perception of social and 
economic transactions, or/and more efficient monitoring and sanctioning of opportunistic acts. 
27 The results of an econometric analysis (Mikulić and Madžarević, 2001) suggest a considerable 
reduction in the size of the UE (more than 50 percent). Considering the method used, the authors warn 
that the estimate given “represents the lower limit of the underground economy as a percentage of 
registered GDP”. 
 
Official 
economic 
activities 
___________ 
underground 
economic 
activities 
Trust in 
institutions 
________ 
 
lack of trust in 
institutions 
High level of 
opportunism: 
low moral costs 
of participating 
in the UE 
 Low level of 
opportunism: 
high moral costs 
of participating 
in the NG 
Calculation of costs
(risk of sanctions)  
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